There has been an initiative in the industry since the 2009 Montara Timor Sea (Australia) and the 2010 Mocondo Gulf of Mexico blowouts to enhance well control operations. One discussion is at http://www.spe.org/jpt/article/9521-deepwater-well-control/
From experience, that includes being an accredited IWCF well control assessor and participating in the collaboration of causes for the Montara and Macondo blowouts, and being close to the to the build up of conclusions of Dr. Andrew Hopkins book Disastrous Decisions "The Human and Organisational Causes of the Gulf of Mexico Macondo Blowout" , With this there are many articles linked to the human factors involving loss control http://www.resourcesandenergy.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/473229/Andrew-Hopkins.pdf
I see additional issues that must be addressed to assure there is certainty in the management of Well Integrity and Well Control process risk.
There is tending to be a focus on deep water, the design of equipment and training of the drilling crew. when I see there are key issues with the geological hazards and in the design of casing and cementing process. The "bladder effect" that was discounted during the assessment of the negative test during the suspension of Macondo. Indeed there was a gas bubble in the well of Macondo and in the well on Montara. The issue in both cases related to a gas bubble being in the well system.
This is due to a geological hazard that prevents a certainty in the well integrity and indeed there are many wells where there may not has not been a specified blowout but other hazards like annular gas migration, sand production and invasion of water leading to production casing corrosion are also issues to address. Another event is the Lusi Mud Volcano in Indonesia http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0feca3d2-24e6-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca.html
My point being, the is an immediate need to take the issue of well control and well integrity beyond training. Simulation for understanding. There is the ASCII mud logging data with mud log reports that provide well bore and geological characteristics that can define process hazards from drilling and completion activities. These can be brought into the process hazard perception and simulation for understanding to assure certainty in risk management. There is a hazard mentioned by Dr. Andrew Hopkins termed "group think" and it also needs to be understood the impact of decisions being forged ahead to where crews are just doing what they are told.
I would appreciate some thoughts on how the crews at the back end of a project can be more integrated into the collaboration at the front end. What prevents this innovative collaboration process between all aspects of a project. Isn't there something beyond process safety that would let there be integrity, reliability and certainty of perceiving process hazards so there can be certainty in the process risk management process. And then there is the condition monitoring of well integrity and well control certainty during the life of the well, including its decommissioning.
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Wayne Needoba
LIS Thailand Co. Ltd.
KarawaraWA
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